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ABSTRACT: A significant part of perception, especially in visual perception, is characterized by particularity (roughly, 
the view that in such cases the perceiver is aware of particular objects in the environment). The intuition of 
particularity, however, can be made precise in at least two ways. One way (proposed by Searle) is consistent 
with the view that the content of perception is to be thought of as existentially quantified. Another way 
(the “demonstrative element” view championed by Evans, Campbell and others in diverse ways) is not. 
This paper reconstructs the argumentative context in which these views are put forward, and, after men-
tioning some drawbacks of both views, as these have been advanced to date, suggests a new view that may 
be regarded as a compromise between the contenders. 
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In his influential posthumous book Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans gave an interest-
ing philosophical explanation for demonstrative intentional contents, both in percep-
tion and in memory. Recently, John Campbell has put forward an alternative explana-
tion for the especially important case of perception in his work Reference and Conscious-
ness. One purpose of this paper is to reconstruct in detail the argumentative context in 
which proposals such as those of Evans and Campbell are to be placed, in which both 
are seen as possessing a spirit opposed to John Searle’s proposal in Intentionality. 
Against the background of this reconstruction the drawback for them that I will men-
tion will become clearer, although due to lack of space I will not be able to discuss 
their proposals in detail. I will then sketch an explanation of demonstrative content 
which tries to overcome the problem alluded to. 
1. Introduction: Particularity and Generality in the Content of Perception 
The intuition of particularity in the intentional content of perception is the intuition that, 
at least in some central cases, when the subject perceives her environment, her experi-
ence seems to be an experience of particular “items” or objects around her. In this pa-
per I will focus primarily on visual perception. Moreover, I will take into account clari-
                                                     
1 I have benefited from long discussions on the issues treated in this paper with Daniel Quesada. I thank 
Manuel García-Carpintero for comments on previous versions of this material. I am also grateful for 
comments by (among others) Juan Acero and Fernando Broncano on a previous version presented 
orally at the IV Congress of the Spanish Society of Analytical Philosophy, which led me to introduce 
what I hope are improvements. I am indebted to Michael Maudsley for his grammatical revision. Re-
search for his paper has. received economic funding from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Tech-
nology, project HUM2005-07539-C02-02. 
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fication and explications of the intuition of particularity within (weak) intentionalism, ac-
cording to which a visual experience is a mental state that represents the world (or 
more precisely, a scene in the world) as something which is of a certain way; the con-
tent of the experience can be correct or incorrect and accordingly the experience is 
veridical or non-veridical. 
 Some philosophers (most prominently David Lewis) have maintained the (concep-
tual) possibility of veridical hallucinations (cases in which the object is present but the 
experience of the subject is artificially caused by a neuroscientist’s stimulation of the 
visual cortex). Allowing for this possibility implies endorsing the Generality Thesis (GT 
from now on) about the content of perception, that is, the thesis that the content of a 
perceptual episode is always an existentially quantified content; thus, (Davies 1992, p. 
26): “…we can take perceptual content to be quantified existential content. A visual 
experience may represent the world as containing an object of a certain size and shape, 
in a certain direction, at a certain distance from the subject”. Hence, for a perceptual 
episode to be veridical, it is sufficient that its content can be described in this existen-
tial way.2 Obviously, those who hold GT do not accept the intuition of particularity. 
 In Soteriou (2000) the possibility of veridical hallucination is regarded as the main 
source of the acceptance of GT. I myself think that the main source is to be found 
elsewhere, that is, in the intuition (or alleged intuition) that the intentional contents of 
perceptions of objects which are indistinguishable for the subject are identical (substi-
tutability intuition); Davies explains thus the reasons for holding this position: 
The source of plausibility is the thought that the perceptual content of experience is a phenome-
nal notion: content is a matter of how the world seems to the experiences... If perceptual content 
is, in this sense, ‘phenomenal content’... then, where there is no phenomenological difference for 
a subject, there is no difference in content. (Davies, loc. cit.) 
If the substitutability intuition is indeed the source for GT, rather than the view that 
there are veridical hallucinations, so much the better for this thesis, since the view is 
dubious. 
 Be this as it may, I will concentrate next on the issue of the conflict between the 
intuitions of particularity and substitutability. 
2. Two senses of particularity 
There are at least two ways of capturing theoretically the intuition of particularity. One 
of them is Searle’s Assumption (Soteriou 2000, p. 176; SA from now) according to 
which a necessary condition for a perceptual experience (of the relevant type) to be 
veridical is that a particular object is thereby indeed perceived. As a requirement, this 
assumption seems to have the intuition of particularity built in, to some degree for the 
following reason: Obviously, the veridicality of an experience depends on which the 
content of that experience is; now, an experience is veridical if the world (the envi-
                                                     
2 Taking “perception” to be a success-word, like the verb “perceive”, I use “perceptual episode” in a 
broad way, so that the obtaining of a perceptual episode does not imply that it is really a case of per-
ception. 
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ronment around the perceiver) corresponds to the content of the experience; hence, if 
the experience being veridical implies that a particular object is indeed being per-
ceived, in a certain sense it is thereby accepted that that particular is involved in the 
content of the experience. 
 The intuition of particularity is also captured in the Object Dependency Thesis 
(ODT): the intentional content of a perceptual (visual) episode of the relevant type is 
individuated by the particular object which causes the perceptual experience. This im-
plies that perceptual experiences of different objects are distinct, no matter how simi-
lar the objects are —even if they are qualitatively identical. 
 It is obvious that both Searle’s Assumption and the Object Dependency Thesis are 
directly in contradiction with the possibility of veridical hallucination. However, they 
behave differently with respect to the Generality Thesis. ODT is totally incompatible 
with GT. As for SA, there certainly seems to be some sort of tension between it and 
GT, since GT is compatible with the possibility of veridical hallucination and SA is 
not. But this does not make them incompatible, for while the negation of such a pos-
sibility follows from SA, the possibility at stake does not follow from GT; in fact it is 
other way around, that is, GT follows from such a possibility. Indeed there is — as we 
will see below — a way of making the assumption compatible with the thesis. 
 It is not the contrast regarding the possibility of veridical hallucination which deci-
sively helps to clarify the situation, but the contrast with regard to veridical misperception. 
A case of misperception occurs when a subject indeed perceives an object but per-
ceives it as having some property or properties that in fact it lacks (the properties at is-
sue may be qualitative, spatial or otherwise). Thus, suppose that for some reason (for 
instance, she may be wearing displacing glasses) the subject perceives an object as in 
front of her which in fact is to her left. In this case the subject misperceives the object 
in failing to place it at the correct location. But we can change the hypothetical situa-
tion to be albe to speak of veridical misperception. Assume that there is indeed a sec-
ond object qualitatively indistinguishable from the first one at the location in which it 
seems to the subject that the first object is located (in front of the subject), and that 
moreover, it seems to the subject as if the second object is located to her right where 
in fact a third qualitatively indistinguishable object is located, which in fact is too far to 
the right of the subject to be perceived by her. 
 This kind of example (borrowed from Martin (1997), as Soteriou says) is meant to 
make prima facie plausible the idea of veridical misperception, and indeed, veridical 
misperception would be a real possibility under the conception of perceptual content 
according to which the correctness conditions of an experience do not depend on 
whether a particular object is being perceived or not. It is used by Soteriou to argue 
against this view of content and thus in favor of SA which denies it (cf. Soteriou 2000, 
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Premise 1. If some part of a subject’s experience is represented as being a 
certain way (in the subject’s experience), and the relevant part of the envi-
ronment is different from the way that it is represented as being, then at 
least one of the conditions required for the correctness of the experience is 
not satisfied. 
Premise 2. If at least one of the conditions required for the correctness of 
the experience is not satisfied, the experience is not completely veridical. 
Premise 3. If the correctness conditions of an experience do not depend on 
whether an object is being perceived, it does not depend on which object is 
being perceived, and if they do not depend on which object is perceived, 
then there can be completely veridical experiences in which at least one of 
the conditions required for the correctness of the experience is not satisfied 
(in other words, there can be veridical misperception). 
______________________________________________________________ 
Conclusion. The correctness conditions of an experience depend on 
whether an object is being perceived. 
Now, this argument does not decide the particularity issue once and for all, as Searle’s 
explanation of the intentional content of perception shows. According to this explana-
tion the fact that an object causes a token perceptual experience is (part of) what indi-
vidualizes the content of the experience; this sort of content finds a rough expression 
in a linguistic formulation of the sort “there is an object with such and such properties 
which causes this experience” (Searle 1983, p. 123). Clearly, this is an explanation 
within the framework of GT (in the general form in which this thesis has been charac-
terized). Indeed, Searle’s explanation of the intentional content of perceptual episodes 
is the way to make GT and SA compatible (even if SA captures an aspect of the intui-
tion of particularity). Thus, accepting both GT and SA implies accepting Searle’s 
explanation of perceptual content. 
 This implication provides prima facie an obvious way to criticize GT: rejecting 
Searle’s explanation of perceptual content while accepting SA logically leads to the re-
jection of GT, as Soteriou stresses (op.cit., p. 181). Now, since it is reasonable to accept 
SA due to the Martin-Soteriou argument, the rejection of GT through this route de-
pends on whether there are good reasons to reject Searle’s explanation of the inten-
tional content of perception, in which some sort of demonstrative reference to the 
experience is part of the content of that very experience. However, the reasons which 
have been given against Searle’s proposal until now are not conclusive. At worst they 
flagrantly beg the question (as when McDowell proposes to preserve the advantages 
of the sort of demonstrative reference in Searle’s proposal by substituting demonstra-
tive reference to the experience by demonstrative reference to the object; cf. McDow-
ell 1991, p. 218). The accusation that Searle’s explanation is implausibly complex (ar-
ticulated in Burge 1991) seems initially to be more acceptable, but Searle answers it 
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forcefully arguing that the complexities of the intentional phenomena “may not be 
immediately available to the agent” (Searle 1991, p. 228; Burge’s objection is discussed 
in the next section). The strongest accusation is that Searle’s explanation is underde-
veloped in several aspects, most prominently in the explanation of the sort of “de-
monstrative reference” to an experience postulated and in the analysis of the concept 
of experience involved (cf. McDowell 1991, p. 217; García-Carpintero 1999, pp. 37-
38). Some critics of Searle’s explanation even make a positive appraisal of some ele-
ments in it, as when Burge maintains that allowing in some way for a reflexive element 
is essential for a good explanation (Burge 1991, p. 202; see below). I think we must 
conclude from this argumentative situation that opposition to Searle’s explanation of 
the intentional content of perception is not based on overwhelming argument, and 
therefore requires the development of a better alternative. 
3. A proposal about demonstrative individuation in perception 
The alternative to Searle’s explanation is an alternative which rejects GT totally, and 
thus implies the acceptance of ODT, the Object Dependency Thesis. However, this 
thesis appears to be unpromising because there seems to be a clear opposition be-
tween ODT and the substitutability intuition. But this opposition turns out to be 
merely apparent, since it is one thing to say that if two experiences have objects which 
to the subject seem indistinguishable the intentional content should reflect this fact, 
and another to say that (therefore) the particular objects at issue cannot partake of the 
content in any way, so that a different intentional content is assigned to those experi-
ences. The first of these two requirements is satisfied if we allow that the contents are 
such that they represent the object at issue as objects which have exactly the same 
properties, and this is fully compatible with the respective contents being (in part) in-
dividualized by means of the respective objects (cf. Martin 1997). 
 Once the route for the acceptance of ODT is thus cleared, we may turn our atten-
tion to explanations of the intentional content of perception that take it into account. 
This leads us to the “demonstrative approach” favored by Evans, McDowell, Burge, 
Peacocke and Campbell, that is, the approach for which the key to that content lies in 
recognizing a “demonstrative element” directed to the particular object. 
 Only the first and last of the philosophers just mentioned have put forward rela-
tively well-developed proposals to this effect, in which the “demonstrative element” 
materializes as perceptual-demonstrative modes of presentation which are explained in some 
detail. One might take issue with the fact that Evans’s a priori general theory of these 
modes of presentation, in which the (objective, holistically determined) spatial location 
of the object takes pride of place, purports to be applicable to all perceptual modalities 
(cf. Campbell 1997, p. 63), and one might also object to Evans’s argument and to the 
“substantial character” of the mode of presentation of particular objects in perception 
involved in his proposal (see footnote 7 below and the text corresponding to it). And 
one should definitely reject the decidedly empirical character of Campbell’s proposal, 
even more implausible for something which is regarded as a mode of presentation in 
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the broad Fregean tradition.3 But there is a common objection to both which to my 
mind obliges us to go on looking for a better proposal. It is that neither of them takes 
any account of the “reflexive element” which it seems should be recognized as part of 
the content (precisely the feature which Searle’s proposal tried, however inadequately, 
to capture). A version of the corresponding prerequisite is stated by Burge thus: “the 
intentional content must itself somehow reflect the causal condition of its satisfac-
tion” (Burge 1991, p. 202). But perhaps it is not exactly the causal relation which must 
be reflected in the condition for the satisfaction of the content, but another relation 
between subject and object which is peculiar of perception. 
 I will now turn to my proposal for capturing the “reflexive element”. As I hope 
will be seen, it is not subject to the criticism that have been leveled at Searle’s pro-
posal. 
 First of all, let me endorse explicitly the claim that there is a kind of perception 
which involves a distinctive sort of individuation of objects, which pre-theoretically 
we think of as demonstrative. Moreover, perception of this kind is linked (constitu-
tively linked, I assume, but I will not defend this assumption here) to a certain sort of 
judgment or thought: perceptual demonstrative thoughts, which are distinguished by 
their involving perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation, or perceptual de-
monstratives for short. These perceptual demonstratives present the object in a sort of 
self-reflexive way. 
 Take as an example the very simple case of a perceptual judgment straightfor-
wardly associated with the utterance “That is a tree”. With some important qualifica-
tions to be discussed presently, we could express its content in the following way: 
(1) The object attended to in this act of attention is a tree. 
According to the proposal made with the help of the formulation in (1),4 the kind of 
perception at issue involves the sort of awareness of an object which consists in (per-
ceptually) attending to it, so that a perceived object is primarily present to the mind of 
the perceiver as the object currently attended to. Hence, according to the proposal, the 
state or episode of attention itself, which is necessarily involved in (this kind of) per-
ception of objects, plays an essential role in individuating the object being attended to. 
                                                     
3 I present a thorough analysis of Evans’s and Campbell’s positions and arguments in my dissertation, 
Fernández Prat (2002). 
4 In a way this follows the lead of a Reichenbachian token-reflexive account of linguistic demonstratives 
(see García-Carpintero 1998). The way must be only heuristic, since the corresponding proposal for 
perceptual demonstratives must stand or fall on its own merits (I am not assuming that an account of 
the demonstrative element in perception must follow at all from one about linguistic demonstratives; 
nor for that matter the other way around). From this heuristic point of view, however, it seems to me 
that the rival approach in the analysis of linguistic demonstratives, which uses the idea of type-in-a-
context (cf. Kaplan 1989), is not very promising: the Reichenbachian approach seems more in conso-
nance with the kind of particularity which is present in perceptual experience and thought. Neverthe-
less, see Gertler (2001). 
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Hence, a state, event or act of attention identifies an object in a token-reflexive sort of 
way.5
 Quite apart from this token-reflexive element, the proposal is based on two intui-
tive ideas. First, when one wants to think about an object in the field of perception 
and to comment on it with somebody else, one must draw his or her attention to it (as 
emphasized in Campbell 2002, p. 2). Moreover, and accordingly, attention seems to 
play in perception a role similar to deictic intentions in linguistic demonstration. If 
pointing to an object when informed by the right deictic intentions serves the function 
of making an object salient to an audience for the purposes of communication, analo-
gously it would seem that attending to an object —visually, auditively or by means of 
touch— has the similar function of making an object salient to the perceiver. 
 It goes without saying that the proposal needs a great deal of clarification, refine-
ment, development and defense. What is it exactly that is claimed by saying that the 
object is presented as attended to, and indeed, as attended in the current act of attention? 
What is the hypothesis about modes of presentation of objects in perception that is 
being advanced? What kind of awareness of the object is involved in (perceptually) at-
tending to it? Does the proposal imply that we have some kind of awareness of atten-
tion in turn? Does it imply that the subject capable of perceptual demonstrative judg-
ments has to possess the concept of attention? What is attention in general, and atten-
tion to objects in particular? What has attention exactly to do with the phenomenol-
ogy of perception?6
 We are here especially interested in the extension of a (neo-)Fregean framework 
beyond the domain of language. Instead of individuative conditions which an object 
must satisfy to be the referent of expressions and which, moreover, are epistemically ac-
cessible to the competent speakers of a language, we are interested in individuative condi-
tions on objects which are epistemically accessible to subjects by virtue of another 
property they may have, here specifically, by virtue of their being normal perceivers. These 
are the conditions which constitute perceptual demonstrative modes of presentation. 
We are interested here in the conditions covering perceptual states (seeing a tree in 
front of one or seeing, say, that a particular tree is blooming), perceptual judgments or 
beliefs (linguistically expressible as, e. g., “That tree is already blooming”), or beliefs 
which might be called “partially perceptual” (“That tree was planted by my father”). 
 The account being developed here is meant to give a “purely perceptual” condition 
on the object, that is, a condition that does not involve any property of the object be-
                                                     
5 Once this proposal for the simple kind of example at stake is stated, it is easy to see how it can be gen-
eralized to other more complex thoughts in the target area. For example, an explanation of the per-
ceptual judgment that we may naturally express linguistically by uttering ‘That (tree) is blooming’ 
would be suggested by the sentence: ‘The object (object of the tree kind) attended to in this act of at-
tention is blooming.’ 
6 I will deal with several of these questions in what follows. As for the rest —omitted here for reasons of 
space, especially those concerned with specifics about the notion of attention involved— they are 
discussed in my dissertation. 
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yond the fact that it is involved in a perceptual episode with a subject.7 According to 
my proposal the object is presented as the object attended to in this (current) act of attention. 
More exactly, the object is presented in a way that can be characterized by means of 
the following condition: 
(2) (being) attended to in this act of attention. 
This may be prima facie regarded as a reasonably individuative property or condition, 
and also as epistemically accessible to the subject, as we will see. As such, it may be 
proposed tentatively as constitutive of the perceptual mode of presentation of the ob-
ject in a perceptual state and/or a perceptual judgment, perceptual belief or partially 
perceptual belief. 
 The next issue is: how exactly should we understand the perceptual mode of pres-
entation characterized by condition (2)? It will help here to make a comparison with 
the linguistic case. It has been proposed that senses of singular linguistic items be re-
garded as ingredients of certain presuppositions, namely, presuppositions of acquaint-
ance with objects (cf. García-Carpintero 2000). Making use of this idea, one might 
propose the following as the “presupposition of acquaintance” in the cases of our in-
terest: 
(3) There is a (unique) tree being attended to in this act of attention. 
Apparently, it is straightforward to regard the defining condition of the mode of pres-
entation as an “ingredient” in the presupposition expressed by (3). A sentence like (3) 
is used to express the existence and uniqueness of something (a particular tree in the 
case at hand). Hence, regarded as expressing a presupposition, it expresses the idea 
that the existence and uniqueness of something is presupposed. But is this presupposi-
tion of existence and uniqueness really an apt candidate for capturing the kind of acquaint-
ance with the object that a perceiver enjoys in the relevant perceptual situation? As 
García-Carpintero says for the parallel linguistic case, associating mere presupposi-
tions of existence and uniqueness to senses would give us a descriptive —narrowly or 
genuinely Fregean— theory of senses, just the sort of theory which has been discred-
ited by the discussion ensuing from Kripke’s work on the reference of proper names 
and from Kaplan’s and Perry’s work on demonstratives (op. cit., p. 132). 
 To understand what this rejection of presuppositions of existence and uniqueness 
amounts to in the case of perception, consider the example of the perceptual judg-
ment in the presence of a particular tree, in full view, to the effect that that tree is (al-
ready) blooming. According to the proposal we are about to reject, the intentional 
content of this judgment might rather straightforwardly being given by the sentence: 
                                                     
7 In this respect my proposal has something of the spirit, if not the letter, of Searle’s and Peacocke’s 
(1983) approaches, and is rather in contrast with approaches such as those of Evans and McDowell 
which make conditions of individuation depend on more “substantial” properties of an object, such 
as its location. Of course, in a sense my account is closest to Campbell’s which is also based in the 
notion of attention, but his appeal to the subpersonal level is in stark contrast to all other approaches, 
including mine. 
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(4)  There is a (unique) tree being attended to in this act of attention, and that 
tree is blooming.  
Focusing on this linguistic formulation as a model of the intentional content of a cor-
responding judgment, we see we can apply Russell’s theory of descriptions (in reverse 
order) to obtain: 
(5) The tree being attended to in this act of attention is blooming. 
As a model of the (intentional content of) the original perceptual judgment, which 
seems definitely to have a (perceptual) demonstrative character, it is immediately 
doubtful that it is on the right track. Admittedly, the demonstrative character is not 
completely lost since there is still a demonstrative expression in the formulation, but 
one might justifiably complain that in the judgment which is being modeled it is intui-
tively the tree which seems to be demonstratively individuated or “presented”, while ac-
cording to that formulation it is the attention to the tree that is modeled as being demon-
stratively presented.8  
 We make a step in the right direction if we propose a referential reading for the de-
scription in (1).9 It seems intuitively more acceptable to think that presuppositions of 
acquaintance with an object should be conceived as being akin to referentially inter-
preted descriptions of that object rather than to attributively interpreted descriptions 
of it. According to the second interpretation, in the linguistic case the speaker “pre-
supposes of some particular someone or something that he or it fits the description” 
(Donnellan 1966, p. 288; Donnellan’s italics). Applying the suggestion to our example 
of the perceptual case, the idea is that when we make the perceptual judgment at issue 
we are presupposing of a particular tree that it is currently being attended to, instead of 
presupposing that there is a unique tree that is currently being attended to. 
 According to the foregoing, a characterization of the perceptual mode of presenta-
tion with the help of the description in (1) is to be understood as a claim that what is 
constitutive of a demonstrative perceptual mode of presentation as being exercised in 
a perceptual judgment (perceptual belief, etc.) is the perceiver’s taking for granted that 
the judgment is about a particular object, precisely the very one which is currently the focus of 
attention.10 Moreover, the characterization of the state of the perceiver as one of “tak-
                                                     
8 The proposal being critically examined in the text can in this way be seen as patently similar to those in 
Searle (1983) and Peacocke (1983) (the latter one rejected by its author). 
9 This is indeed the move suggested in García-Carpintero (2000): 133-135 for the parallel case of linguistic 
demonstratives. 
10 To the extent that the mode of presentation, in being epistemically accessible to the subject, is meant to 
capture at least partially “how things are from within”, the perspective of consciousness, the present 
proposal aligns itself with Eilan’s requirement that “the existence and identity of spatio-temporal ob-
jects” is not “extrinsic” to the characterization of how things are from within such perspective (cf. 
Eilan 1997: 236). Such “existence and identity”, however, are established more by way of an individua-
tion than by way of an identification which, as in Evans’s theory, involves fundamental properties of the 
object. 
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ing for granted” or “presupposing” aims at the very least to capture the idea that the 
fact that the judgment is precisely about the object being attended to does not in any way occupy the 
attention of the perceiver.11 Still, the “token-reflexive” element in the formulation is 
there because, according to the proposal, some sort of awareness of the attention cur-
rently being paid to the object is involved, an awareness which should be mirrored in 
the actions of the subject vis à vis the object attended to. 
 The question is now how to characterize the kind of awareness of attention in-
volved. A full characterization would require us to go deeper into the issue of the rela-
tion of attention to the phenomenology of perception, something that would take us 
beyond the reasonable limits of this paper. Nevertheless, something about the aware-
ness at stake should and can be said to complete the proposal in a reasonable way. 
 An understanding of the awareness of attention involved in the cases of our inter-
est can be gained from the psychological notions of a schema and a perceptual cycle, intro-
duced in Neisser (1976). The general idea is that, in perception, information must be 
fitted into previously existing schemata in order to be made sense of, schemata which 
correspond to different perceptual cycles.12 These notions are aptly summarized in 
Roessler (1999), p. 56 as follows: 
A perceptual cycle, in Neisser’s sense, consists of three elements: an anticipatory schema, specify-
ing what kind of information the perceiver aims, and expects, to acquire; exploratory activity 
guided by the schema, such as looking or listening; and finally, the information picked up as a re-
sult of this activity, which in turn modifies the schema. 
According to Neisser, even newborn infants “know ... how to find out about their en-
vironment, and how to organize the information they obtain so it can help them ob-
tain more ... [not] very well, but well enough to begin“ (Neisser 1976, p. 63). As we 
learn, of course, we are able to make more and more conjectures about our environ-
ment, and we tend to expect certain responses to our conjectures from it. In this way 
the information gathered partially depends on the abilities of the perceiver. We may 
then say that “We can see only what we know how to look for”, (ibid.: 20), at least if 
we give to the word “know” the weak interpretation needed to be able to apply it to 
newborn infants. Neisser’s notion of a perceptual cycle is, indeed, “relatively unde-
manding and inclusive” (Roessler 1999, p. 57), and so is the notion of a schema in-
volved. 
 Schemata both direct the activity of looking and prepare the subject for what can be found (cf. 
Neisser, op. cit., pp. 20-21). Furthermore, “[t]he outcome of the explorations — the 
information picked up — modifies the original schema. Thus modified, it directs fur-
ther exploration and becomes ready for more information” (ibid). 
                                                     
11 On this notion of occupying one’s attention see Peacocke (1998). 
12 Appeal to Neisser’s ideas should not be thought of, I believe, as an appeal to a fully empirical theory of 
scientific (cognitive) psychology. Even though those ideas come from an empirical psychologist, 
Neisser’s reflections about schemata and the perceptual cycle have much of the character of common 
sense psychology developed by philosophical reflection. 
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 Neisser is thus effectively conceiving perception as involving “intentional ele-
ments”, and this means that talking of achievement and failure in perception makes sense. But it 
is not only that this talk makes sense. The key point is that the subject must somehow be 
aware of achievement (or failure) because only thus can it be detected that a perceptual 
cycle has been closed and a new one can be initiated. In Roessler’s words, there must 
be “some kind of monitoring, aimed at establishing whether the intention is fulfilled” 
(Roessler 1999, p. 59); the subject needs to monitor the success, or otherwise, of her activity. 
 Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that the “searching” activity at stake 
involves attending to the environment. Thus, I suggest that what I have called “acts or 
episodes of attending” in the presentation of my proposal for perceptual demonstra-
tive modes of presentation, can be seen as being individuated by perceptual cycles, 
and hence, the need to monitor the success or otherwise of the subject’s activity is at 
the same time a need to monitor when an act or episode of attending has been accomplished, so 
that a new one may start. 
 For a better understanding of this claim, let us turn to an objection raised in Burge 
(1991) against Searle’s account of the intentional content of a perceptual experience, 
and which might likewise be thought to affect mine mutatis mutandis. Burge is objecting 
to the fact that Searle’s formulation, with its apparent reference to the experiences of 
the perceiver (cf. section 2 above), requires him to be aware of these experiences or to 
have some immediate cognitive access to them. There are, Burge admits, loose senses 
in which it can be said that perceivers are “aware of” their visual experiences. But, ac-
cording to Burge, the sense in which Searle requires this to be so is a stronger one: 
“Reference to those experiences must be part of every visual experience of physical ob-
jects” (op. cit., p. 204). This, however, would require that the subject, rather than a sys-
tem within it, has “some means of distinguishing experiences from the objects they 
are experiences of” (ibid.). However “although visual experiences are manipulated 
within the visual system, they are not thereby referred to by the subject in visual ex-
periences... [e]mpirical evidence and common sense both suggest that they are not 
supplied to visually based thoughts useable by the central cognitive system” (ibid). 
Therefore, requiring something as strong as reference to the experience itself would 
not capture what “visual experience itself transmits to us” (210), and, because of this, 
Searle’s proposal “gives a misleading picture of mental ability” (209). 
 Burge is here presupposing that “[f]or the subject’s judgments to make reference 
to visual experiences, the subject himself, not merely a sub-system of the subject, must 
be capable of making discriminations between experiences and physical objects” (205). 
“I think,” he adds, “that these are what are ordinarily called ‘conceptual discrimina-
tions’.” 
 Transferring these remarks to the discussion of the view being advanced here, I 
think that we must agree that it is the subject himself and not merely a sub-system of 
his which must be said to be able to discriminate between the object attended to and 
the act of attention. What I do not see is why we should agree that it is a conceptual dis-
crimination on the part of the subject that is required, so that the subject must possess 
the required concepts to make the discriminations. 
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 Thus, when I base the awareness of acts of attention on the postulation of their 
“monitoring”, this is not done in the spirit of advancing a cognitive-psychological hy-
pothesis about sub-systems of the perceiving subject (although it might lead to one). 
On the contrary, the sort of monitoring involved, like the perceptual cycle as a whole, 
is something in which the person himself engages. The postulation at issue is a claim at 
the personal rather than the subpersonal level. However, this does not imply that the 
perceiver can quite readily make it clear to herself that she is engaging in acts of atten-
tion. 
 What is rejected here is a view that sees only two possibilities for deciding about 
(representational) contents and about abilities. One is that we characterize such con-
tents or abilities exclusively on the basis of what is immediately available or manifest to 
the subject. We, as theorists, decide what the relevant traits of contents or abilities are 
only on the basis of something like asking people (or indeed ourselves), or more or 
less casual introspections. In any case, in a way that we can easily recover. The other possi-
bility is that such contents or abilities are characterized by appealing to empirical cog-
nitive science or neuroscience in terms of which the subject has “no inkling”, to use 
Campbell’s expression. I think that there is room for a third possibility: briefly, in 
what appears to be just thus and so on the basis of more or less casual introspection 
there is actually ample room for discussion, for rational reconstruction, or for theory 
overriding first-hand intuitions. Nevertheless, the discussion proceeds always within 
the boundaries of what subjects of experience and action are able to recognize, if they 
are brought to think of it in the right way. I cannot hope to substantiate this sort of in-
termediate position here, but it is fair to say that the work of theorists like Searle, Pea-
cocke, Shoemaker or indeed Burge himself, lends some strong plausibility to it. 
 Thus, I side with Searle when, in his reply to Burge’s criticism, he rejects the view 
that “the description of a conscious [i]ntentional content should be given in terms 
which are part of the immediate consciousness of the agent” (Searle 1991, p. 231). 
This is not to say that Searle is justified in defending his position against Burge’s criti-
cism. The heart of the matter is that, as Burge says, it seems unavoidable to interpret 
Searle’s proposal as postulating reference to an experience on the part of a normal act of 
perception, which on the face of it, seems an implausibly strong claim, certainly in 
need of a specific explanation and defense which goes beyond Searle’s general stand-
point and which, unfortunately, he does not provide. In contrast, no reference to any in-
ternal (or indeed external) event or process is postulated in my proposal of a percep-
tual demonstrative mode of presentation. Moreover, the reflexive element contained 
in it is certainly not left unexplained. The demonstrative expression in its linguistic 
formulation (“this act of attention”) only aims to signal that, according to such a pro-
posal, there is an awareness of sorts of the current act of attention, an awareness 
which has been explained in terms of the perceptual cycle. Furthermore, there is no 
“indirection” here, the cause of worry expressed by theorists like Burge (1991) or 
McDowell (1991) about Searle’s proposal. Attention is on the (physical) object; there 
is no attention to (acts of) attention: the kind of awareness of attention, which cer-
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